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Executive Summary
Public banks face a public contract to provide credit access to firms and
households within their business district. Closely related to that, coopera-
tive banks aim to support their members. Both are asked to finance projects
as long as economically sustainable. Bank owners grand additional payment
that reduce refinancing costs. It is argued, that private banks are disadvan-
taged due to these refinancing cost differentials and competition is distorted.
While the strategy set of public and cooperative banks is fixed, private banks
are free to choose which strategy they want to apply.
In this paper I analyze, whether private banks adopt a different lending
strategy. If private banks act as hard-nosed bankers as firms become finan-
cially distressed, the probability of market exit should be higher compared
to firms financed by public or cooperative banks. In order to test this em-
pirically probit models are employed estimating the probability of market
exit for firms that became financially distressed in the years between 2000
and 2005. A Heckman variation of the probit model controls for potential
selection bias due to the data generating process. Information on firm's fi-
nancing behavior, entrepreneurial education, as well as internal and external
factors influencing a firm's market exit are used as covariates. Results show
that firms with a savings or a cooperative bank as their main bank present
a lower probability of exiting the market than those with private banks.
The reasons for different lending strategies remain unclear. A possible ex-
planation would be that private banks adopt stricter rules when firms become
financial distressed. Private banks could ask for additional control rights or
rule out renegotiation in general. Private banks credit portfolio risk reduces
indirectly if high-risk firms anticipated the behavior of the private banks and
self select to public or cooperative banks. But the approximated credit port-
folio risk by bank types, based on firms credit rating scores, indicate that
private banks bear higher risk compared to public or cooperative banks.
Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Sparkassen und andere öffentliche Banken verfolgen neben ihren wirtschaft-
lichen Zielen den öffentlichen Auftrag, für die Kreditversorgung in ihrem Ge-
schäftsgebiet Sorge zu tragen. Kreditgenossenschaften haben das Ziel, ihre
Mitglieder zu fördern. Die Strategie in der Kreditvergabe ist insofern einge-
schränkt, dass beide Banktypen die Finanzierung von Unternehmen in finan-
ziellen Schwierigkeiten aufrechterhalten, soweit dies als ökonomisch tragfähig
erscheint. Private Banken sind in ihrer Strategienwahl nicht eingeschränkt.
In diesem Papier wird untersucht, ob sich die Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit
von Unternehmen in finanziellen Schwierigkeiten nach dem Banktyp unter-
scheidet. Sollten Privatbanken als Banker mit einer kalten Schnauze auftre-
ten, dann müssten von diesen Banken finanzierte Unternehmen in finanziellen
Krisen eine höhere Marktaustrittswahrscheinlichkeit aufzeigen. Mit Hilfe von
Probit Modellen wird die Marktaustrittswahrscheinlichkeit von Unternehmen
geschätzt, die zwischen den Jahren 2000 und 2005 in finanzielle Schwierig-
keiten geraten sind. Eine Heckman-Variante kontrolliert für eine Selektion
des datengenerierenden Prozesses. Als Kovariate fliessen Informationen zum
Finanzierungsverhalten, Bildungsgrad des Unternehmers, unternehmensin-
terne sowie externe Faktoren des Marktaustritts in die Schätzungen ein. Die
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Unternehmen mit einer Sparkasse als Hausbank ei-
ne geringere Marktaustrittswahrscheinlichkeit aufweisen. Der Effekt ist für
Genossenschaftsbanken noch ausgeprägter.
Die Gründe für den Zusammenhang zwischen Banktyp und Wahrschein-
lichkeit des Marktaustritts eines Unternehmens sind allerdings weniger ein-
deutig. Eine Erklärung könnte sein, dass Privatbanken Nachverhandlungen
von Krediten anders handhaben und stärkere Kontrollrechte fordern oder
Nachverhandlungen ausschließen. Dies würde indirekt zu einer Risikoreduzie-
rung im Kreditportfolio von Privatbanken führen, sollten risikoreiche Un-
ternehmen dieses Verhalten antizipieren und vorrangig Partnerschaften mit
Sparkassen oder Genossenschaftsbanken eingehen. Auf der Basis von unter-
nehmensbezogenen Kreditscores wurde die Risikostruktur der Bankengrup-
pen approximiert. Die Ergebnisse deuten allerdings auf ein höheres Risiko
bei Privatbanken hin.
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Abstract
Do private banks act as hard-nosed bankers when firms get finan-
cially distressed compared to public banks that have the mandate to
support regional economy?
For German firms in the period 2000-2005, I find that the proba-
bility of leaving the market after financial distress is higher for firms
financed by private banks. The effects of different lending strategies
are even larger for cooperative banks than for public banks.
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1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
Financial intermediaries screen projects and allocate funds in profitable in-
vestments. As complete contracts are not feasible there may be a need to
renegotiate financial contracts. This is especially true for firms becoming
financially distressed. Banks can audit the firm again and decide whether
to keep financing or to liquidate it. Banks can "lean against the wind" and
keep with their customers when they are most in need (Petersen and Rajan,
1995). They do so, if expected, discounted future payments are higher than
liquidation value of the firm's assets. During renegotiation banks will ask
for further control rights over firms assets (Ongena and Smith, 1998). Debt
becomes equity-like as the relationship between the bank and their customer
gets closer and the bank is able to obtain inside information. This puts banks
in a better position to extract future surplus from profitable projects.
Lending strategies might differ between banks. Bank's possibility to ex-
tract future surpluses depends on their investment in sector specification
and the concentration in the local banking market (Boot and Thakor, 2000).
In addition, lending behavior might differ among bank types. In Germany,
private banks compete in a market with public and cooperative banks. Pub-
lic and cooperative banks have a mandate or aim supporting regional eco-
nomic development (Baas and Schrooten, 2005; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2006;
Engerer, 2006) and keep financing financially distressed but viable firms
(Matthey, 2008). Traditionally, public and cooperative banks build up close
relationships to their customers and adopt different lending strategies com-
pared to private banks (Engerer and Schrooten, 2004). There is anecdotic
evidence that private banks act as hard-nosed bankers and are not that inter-
ested in relationships especially with small and medium sized firms. Hilmar
Kopper1 made an in Germany well known statement that the sum of unpaid
bills of failed craft enterprisers are peanuts compared with the banks loss
during the Schneider-affaire.2
1Hilmar Kopper, the chairman of the Detusche Bank from 1989-1997 made the state-
ment during press a conference on April 24th, 1994 (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
1994).
2The Deutsche Bank was heavily involved in financing a construction company owned
by Jürgen Schneider. The company modernized historical buildings, in particular. In order
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Although close bank relations can be beneficial for firms, especially in an
episode of financial distress, they come at a cost. Firms are informational
locked in and can not easily switch to other financing partners (Boot and
Thakor, 2000). In addition to bank's lending strategy and firm's financing
behavior, firm's probability of market exit depends on internal and external
factors, such as firm age, industry or the entrepreneurs educational back-
ground.
In this article I explore whether the probability of market exit of finan-
cially distressed firms depends on the bank type of their housebank. I use
further variables in order to control for firm's financing behavior, as well as
internal and external factors. The sample is restricted to the 2000 - 2005
period. The model controls for serious selection bias concerning unobserved
distress situations of firms survived. I will show that the probability of mar-
ket exit is higher for firms financed by private banks.
The paper is organized as follows: The introduction is followed by a review
of the literature concerning lending and firm survival. Section 3 describes
data sources and variables. Since the German three pillar banking system
is special, a brief description of the main differences is provided.3 In section
4 the empirical model and results are presented and discussed. Section 5
summarizes the findings and concludes the paper.
2 Banking and Firm Survival
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that financial intermediaries acting as del-
egated monitors are able to realize economies of scope and scale in obtaining
information about borrowers. They have advantages in collecting and ana-
lyzing information on investment projects compared to multiple financiers,
and they reduce costly information asymmetries. Therefore, financial inter-
mediaries allocate capital to profitable investment projects and decide on
their liquidation if unprofitable. As the share of funds provided is suffi-
to receive finance, documents and books were manipulated. Information became public
and the firm failed in 1994. The total bank debt accumulated to 5.4 bn DEM, around 2
bn DEM financed by the Deutsche Bank.
3A more detailed analysis of the German financial system and the link to corporate
finance is provided in Krahnen and Schmidt (2004).
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ciently large, there is a direct link between bank lending and the survival of
financially distressed firms. In a world of asymmetric information complete
contracts are not feasible and there may be a need to renegotiate financial
contracts. In such a situation, long-term interaction between borrowers and
banks is mutually beneficial (Rajan, 1998).
Bank's Lending Strategy Banks benefit from a long-term relationship
strategy as intertemporal transfers in loan pricing are value-enhancing. Banks
learn about the type of the entrepreneur and receive inside information (Pe-
tersen and Rajan, 1994; Fama, 1985) while its importance depends on the
length of the duration (Ongena and Smith, 1998). Inside debt is underlined
by the banks ability to either refuse future lending or to accommodate the
firm with new loans, conditional on actions taken by the firm during and after
the distress period. Therefore, banks can exert control over the firms' asset
management (Ongena and Smith, 1998). Inside information also increases
liquidation value of provided securities (Diamond and Rajan, 2001a,b) and
put lenders in a better position when it comes to renegotiation of debt con-
tracts (Boot and Thakor, 2000).
Banks need to invest in sector specification in order to generate expertise
and to add value. Since banks' specification cost is independent of borrowers'
quality, but rent is a decreasing function of borrowers' quality, costs exceed
the marginal benefit at a sufficiently high quality level (Boot and Thakor,
2000). Bank's investment in sector specification, and therefore it's lending
strategy, critically depends on the competition within the banking market
and from the capital market (Ongena and Smith, 1998; Sharpe, 1990; Rajan,
1992; Boot and Thakor, 2000). A monopolistic bank can charge low payments
during the period of financial distress and extract future surpluses. In a
competitive banking environment banks should be less likely to keep financing
financially distressed firms, since those with improved quality seek finance
from competitors and switch the bank (Petersen and Rajan, 1995).
Strategies financing financially distressed firms might be different among
bank types. Public banks and cooperative banks build up close relationships
to their local customers. They are especially involved in small and medium
entrepreneurial finance and invest in specification of sectors that are related
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to their business operating area (Engerer and Schrooten, 2004). These banks
have a mandate or aim supporting regional economic development (Baas and
Schrooten, 2005; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2006). Related to corporate finance
this can be interpreted in a way that public banks keep financing financial
distressed firms that are still viable (Matthey, 2008).
Firms financing behavior Firm's survival probability after financial dis-
tress is also influenced by its financing behavior. Relationship building in
lending adds value to borrowers in several dimensions. Firms have an easier
access to finance and reduced collateral requirements (Petersen and Rajan,
1995), the  `two-audience signaling problems is reduced (Boot, 2000), and
an insurance in case of sudden and temporary difficulties is provided (Elsas
and Krahnen, 1998). The costs are an information monopoly of the main
lender that possesses a potential risk on borrowers due to ex post bargaining
power (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Mayer, 1988; Rajan, 1992).
Firms can mitigate the hold up problem by multiple sources of finance
such as other financial intermediaries or trade credit. But with an increasing
number of lenders and decreasing share of financing by a single institution
firms face a higher probability of being rationed and it becomes harder to
coordinate renegotiation (Thakor, 1996).
Further determinants of firms exit Literature on firm survival identi-
fies several internal (firm-specific) and external factors related to the firm's
business environment (Manjón-Antolín and Arauzzo-Carod, 2008) influenc-
ing a firm's probability of exit. These factors also need to be considered
in order to explore the bank types influence of market exit of financially
distressed firms.
Geroski (1995) suggests that firm age and size are positively related to
the probability of firm survival. Related to age, firms face liability of "new-
ness" (Freeman et al., 1983), "adolescence" (Fichman and Levinthal, 1991),
or "senescence" (Hannan, 1998). Recently established firms need time to set-
tle and invest, learn about their abilities, and draw from the initial capital.
Therefore, failure risk increases over time and reaches a peak. Older firms
might be ill-suited for changes in competitive environment (Esteve-Pérez and
3 DATA 5
Manez-Castillejo, 2008). Many studies show inverse u-shaped or other non-
linear age effects on firm survival. The firms probability to survive should
be positively related to size for several reasons. Small firms face liability of
"smallness" (Freeman et al., 1983). Larger firms are better able to diversify
and are less prone to shocks in single markets. They may also be in a bet-
ter position acquiring capital and labor (Esteve-Pérez and Manez-Castillejo,
2008). Differences in size also reflect differences in efficiency. Larger firms are
more likely to produce on their industry minimum efficient scale (Audretsch
and Mahmood, 1995) and differ in organizational form and managerial ability
(Esteve-Pérez and Manez-Castillejo, 2008). Empirical studies find a decreas-
ing, non-linear size effect on firms failure probability (Esteve-Pérez et al.,
2004; Strotmann, 2007).
Harhoff et al. (1998) introduce the firm's choice of liability rules to sur-
vival models because the legal form reflects systematic differences in the mode
of ownership transfer and the entrepreneurs' assessment of projects riski-
ness. There are also differences for information disclosure and bankruptcy
law. External factors represent specific conditions of the firm's business en-
vironment, such as industry and business cycle, influencing a firm's survival
function. Industries differ in life cycle, entry and exit rates, industry specific
shocks, or capital intensity (Geroski, 1995; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995;
Audretsch, 1995; Harhoff et al., 1998; Agarwal and Grot, 2002; Esteve-Pérez
and Manez-Castillejo, 2008).
3 Data
In order to find evidence for different lending strategies of different bank
types (private, public, and cooperative banks), the probability of exit of fi-
nancially distressed firms is estimated. As described in the previous section,
the firm's probability of survival is influenced not only by the main bank's
type but also by the firm's financing behavior. In addition, firms characteris-
tics are used to control for internal and external factors influencing the firm's
probability of market exit. The empirical analysis is based on the Mannheim
Enterprise Panel (MUP) and a bank panel. First, a brief description of the
German banking system is given. Second, data sources and the data gener-
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ating process are described, followed by definitions and descriptive statistics
of variables at hand.
3.1 German Banking System
The structure of the German banking system is often described as the Three
Pillar System (Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004; Engerer and Schrooten, 2004)
and consists of public, cooperative and private banks. Table 3 provides a list
of banks assigned to the above mentioned bank types.
There are four types of public banks active in Germany. The Deutsche
Bundesbank (no. 1, Table 3) and public development banks (no. 4, Table
3, either on the state or federal level) have special purposes. Since these
banks do not act as ordinary lenders within the German banking system,
they are excluded from the analysis. Savings banks are owned by the district
or municipality and are therefore organized in a decentralized manner. Gov-
ernments need to credibly promise bail-out of state-owned banks in order to
avoid bank runs. Owners' liability for additional payments used to be an im-
portant characteristic of state-owned banks.4 The savings banks act restricts
the operating area of savings banks to the area of the district or municipality
by whom they are owned5 and defines the mandate to provide finance and
financial services to the people, companies, and local authorities within the
business district supporting regional economic development (e.g. article 6
SpG (2005), Engerer and Schrooten (2004)), as well as banking group spe-
cific regulation in addition to overall banking regulation. Savings banks act
as ordinary lenders with a market share of 15% in corporate finance (see
Table 2).
Members of the supervisory board of savings banks are jointly elected by
administrative authorities and bank's staff, while the chair of the board is
linked to the position of the district administrator. Therefore, politicians de-
cide on the bank's strategy, the board of managers and individual substantial
4Gewährträgerhaftung and Anstaltslast describe an unlimited cover by the banks own-
ers in case of distress. Within the transition period from 19.07.2001 to 18.07.2005 Anstalt-
slast and Gewährträgerhaftung for savings banks were abolished. Because of grandfather-
ing major change came into place in 2005.
5Local or regional restriction of the bank's operating area is also known as the Regional
Principle.
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financing cases.
Landesbanks are jointly owned by savings banks and federal states. The
mission of a Landesbank is to support savings banks and municipalities by
whom they are owned. These banks are involved in local public business
development programs but also participate in corporate finance directly (with
a market share of 20%).6
Cooperative banks are owned by individuals that hold cooperative shares.
The purpose of cooperative banks is to promote the acquisition and the
business of members (Engerer, 2006, p. 15). According to cooperative
bank's status and mission statement, these banks support their members
and enhance regional development. Cooperative banks can perform the same
functions as public banks (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2006). The supervisory
board is elected by the cooperative members while members votes are often
restricted to heads instead of numbers of shares hold by individuals. In case
of insolvency members of a cooperative bank are called for additional but
restricted payment.
Private banks are either commercial banks or real-estate credit institu-
tions. Mostly, these banks operate in a legal form of a public listed stock or
a limited liability company. Therefore, owners' liability is limited by their
capital contribution. Private banks take a decision on the commercial basis
and are not restricted to a certain lending policy (Engerer, 2006).
3.2 Data Sources
The core data comes from the MUP, maintained by the Centre for European
Economic Research (ZEW). The MUP is a firm-level database collected by
Creditreform, the largest credit rating agency in Germany. Since 1999, ZEW
receives twice a year a full back up of Creditreform's data warehouse of firm-
level data and constructs the panel. The database has a nearly full coverage
of firms located in Germany. The MUP is based on information that allows
to assess a firm's credit worthiness. Firm information gets updated on an
irregular basis; on average every 9 months. Firm information is collected
6See e.g. Staatsvertrag über die Bildung einer gemeinsamen Sparkassenorganisation in
Hessen und Thüringen, chapter 1 B, article 8.1, 8.3, 8.4, and 9, 2006.
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decentralized by 120 regional Creditreform branches. Even if the investiga-
tion procedure applies to certain standards, sources and quality may differ
between Creditreform branches (Almus et al., 2000).
Due to the data generating process, the MUP database is prone to sample
selection. Time between updates and quality of data may differ between
both Creditreform branches and firm characteristics. A lack of data quality
corresponding to a deterioration state of the mode of payment might lead to a
serious sample selection bias. This is the case if the observation of this event
is correlated with the firm's insolvency. In other words, data collector infers
from firm insolvency noticed that this firm must have had serious financial
difficulties. The chance that a change of the mode of payment is observed
for firms that recover after a short period is low.
The MUP contains information concerning firm's bank relations. A bank
panel containing information on the number of branches, bank type, the
bank's business district, and the number of competitors in local banking
markets7 is matched with respective bank relations. Due to consolidation in
German banking market, the number of banks reduced considerably during
the sample period. The bank panel reflects bank mergers between 2000 and
2005.8
3.3 Variable Description
3.3.1 Dependent and Restrictive Variables
The empirical model estimates the probability of financially distressed firms
in period t to exit the market in the next t + n periods, where n equals a 6
months period. For data processing reasons the sample is a randomized 10%
sub-sample of the total population of economically active, non-financial firms
that have become financially distressed. In 2005 unlimited state guarantees
for public banks were abolished and important legislative changes came in
7Local banking markets are defined by administrative districts, so called Landkreise or
kreisfreie Städte. A bank is assigned to a district if at least one branch is operated.
8Information on bank mergers was provided by: Deutscher Sparkassen und Giroverband
for the savings banks; Bundesverband der Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken for cooperative
banks; BankScope for private banks.
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power concerning standards of banks' decision making process in lending.9
These regulatory changes might have influenced banks' lending strategy, es-
pecially the way of dealing with financially distressed firms. Therefore, the
sample is restricted to the period between 2000 and 2005. The years 2006
and 2007 are left for the identification of market exit in successive sample
periods.
Identification of financially distressed firms Identification of financial
distress is crucial for the sample selection. It is identified if the firm's mode
of payment status deteriorates, based on information provided in the MUP.
Similar to Kaiser (2001), the characteristics of firms' mode of payment are
categorized in four groups. First, mode of payment is without any complaints
or mode of payment is sound but occasional payments have been made after
term of payment expired. Second, payments have been made later than 30
days after the agreed term of payment or the firm has been reminded several
times. Third, payments has been delayed seriously, e.g. payments have not
been made within three month, and fourth, no payments have been made
due to insolvency. An episode of financial distress is defined as an increase
in the firms' mode of payment status. The fourth category does not directly
determine market exit. Moreover, there is a sufficiently large number of firms
which mode of payment status recovered.
Firms are selected according to this restriction variable. The overall sam-
ple consists of 556,595 firms of which 67,550 firms have become financial
distressed. Because firms can face several episodes of financially distress
within the sample period a total of 86,564 cases are observed. Due to data
limitation for certain variables 67,102 cases are used for the empirical analy-
sis. For robustness checks a change in the firm's credit worthiness, assessed
by Creditreform, is used as an indicator of financial distress.
Identification of firm's market exit Firm's exit serve as the dependent
variable. Insolvencies are known since any insolvency proceeding is to be
9Next to abolished state guarantees for public banks the Basle II accord came into power
at the end of that period via the Bundesamt für Finanzaufsicht letters 34/2002 (minimum
standards for business credit), 18/2005 (minimum standards for risk management), and
European Union guidelines 2006/48 and 2006/49.
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made public. Voluntary exit is considered if recognized by Creditreform.
In some cases I observed a deterioration of the mode of payment status
later than the date of market exit. In these cases I set the date of market
exit equal to the last change in mode of payment observed in the panel.10
Table 4 presents the number of financially distressed firms, the number of
firms having left the market within a two-year-period after facing a financial
distress in the given year in absolute terms and relative to the number of
firms financed by the bank type, respectively. A comparison of columns 4, 7,
and 10 shows that firms financed by private banks exit the market more often
after financial distress. On average, financial distress is found for 1.89% of
observations per sample period. In 39.3% of these cases, firms exit the market
within four successive sample periods.
3.3.2 Independent Variables
Following with the discussion Section 2, I assume that exit of distressed firms
depends on the firm's banking and finance behavior as well as on internal and
external factors. Table 5 defines variables and presents descriptive statistics
of independent variables for financially distressed firms.
In the overall panel, 23.8% of the firms use a private bank as the main
bank, 48.5% of the firms use public banks and 27.7% use cooperative banks.11
Regional banking market concentration is considerably high, given 12 banks
active per district on average.
As renegotiation depends on the number and the shares of creditors, the
model captures two types of information. First, the Number of Bank Rela-
tions controls for diversity of bank finance and counts the number of bank
branch relations. Different branches belonging to the same bank holding
count as one. The median number of bank relationships is one while the
mean is 1.28. These findings are considerably lower compared to other stud-
ies concerning Germany. Elsas and Krahnen (1998) report a median of 5
10This is the case for 2.469 episodes of financial distress, while 2,270 firms are affected.
11The presented figures are restricted to the first bank observation per firm in the sample.
Differences to the figures presented in Table 2 occur because cases are considered rather
than volume. From the comparison one can infer that private banks finance larger firms
with higher credit volume.
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relations to banks and Ongena and Smith (2001) find that the number of re-
lationships is 8 on average, while the median is 5. Unfortunately, the share of
finance according to the banks is not observed. Second, there is no direct in-
formation about trade credit. However, if credit between firms is sufficiently
large and especially in situations of distress, creditors commission debt collec-
tors. Information on Creditreform mandate to collect debt from a particular
firm is therefore used as a proxy for sufficiently large outstanding non-bank
debt captured by the dummy variable VC Debt Collection. I assume that
banks collateralize any residential, commercial, or mixed property owned by
the firm. A quarter of all firms can use Real Estate property as collateral for
bank loans. 18% of the financially distressed firms of the sample face two or
more episodes of financial distress covered by the variable History of Distress.
The mean is 1.295 while only four firms have a maximum of 6 episodes of
distress.
In line with other studies on firm survival, I include several variables
grouped as internal factors. Almost a third of all firms are listed in public
Business Register, while most firms are managed by a single entrepreneur
rather than a Management Team. Successful negotiation with claim holders
might also be influenced by personal ability that is captured by entrepreneurs'
educational background. For 12% of all firms in the sample the highest
level of education within the management team is Master Craftsman12 and
for another 12% Academic. Early studies on firm survival (Audretsch and
Mahmood, 1995; Mata et al., 1995; Honjo, 2000) used initial start-up size.
In contrast Mata et al. (1995) and Esteve-Pérez and Manez-Castillejo (2008)
argue that current size is a better failure predictor. Therefore, Size contains
the log of the number of employees in the respective period. Second and
third polynomial of size controls for non-linearity. Almost two third of the
financially distressed firms are less than 13 years old and 10% age 50 years
or older.
Industry dummies capture differences in business structure and industry
cycles.13 Almost a thirds of all financially distressed firms are located in East
12A master certificate represents a higher degree of business qualification awarded either
by the chamber of industry and commerce or the chamber of crafts.
13Firms allocation to industry dummies is based on German business classification code
from 1993.
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Germany.
3.3.3 Variables of Selection Equation
The selection equation consists of variables explaining the probability of ob-
serving financial distress. Quality of investigation differs among Creditreform
branches. I analyze the following information in order to asses quality per
branch and period: First, the time elapsed between firm foundation and the
first observation. Second, the share of firms with unknown date of foun-
dation. Third, the share of firms obliged to register with unknown date of
business registration. Fourth, the share of firms for which the number of
employees is unknown. Fifth, the number of new firms observed related to
the total number in stock and last, the number of firms where the branch was
asked for information related to the total number of firms in stock. The last
two have a positive effect on the investigation quality of each branch while
all others are negative. High correlation between these variables would lead
to serious multicollinearity problems while the underlying factor remained as
quality is of interest. For this reason Branch Quality expresses the common
factor of these variables.
The constructed variable should have an influence on the probability that
financial distress is observed but it should not be correlated with the error
term of the main equation. For this reason, Branch Quality is imposed as an
exclusion restriction (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). All other variables used
in the selection equation are on the individual firm level and reflect whether
sufficient firm-related information should be available. They are defined in
Table 5.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Econometric Model
In order to analyze how differences in market exit probabilities of financially
distressed firms are related to the type of their bank, I estimate a probit model
on firm survival. The model is closely related to Van de Ven and Van Praag
(1981). As noted in the previous Section, I can identify firms facing financial
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distress in the data. Unfortunately, I can not observe whether a bank applies
audit to distinguish between viable and non-viable firms or if a renegotiation
has taken place. However, I can distinguish between firms that survive and
those that exit the market. From this finding, I can infer that surviving firms
successfully renegotiate debt contracts. All else equal, the probability that
a distressed firm will survive should differ across different banks types. The
probability of market exit can be specified as:
Mi = α
′Xi + ²1i (1)
where Mi is a dummy variable that equals 0 if firm i survives and 1 if it exits.
Xi is a vector of independent variables of firm i. The probability for firm i,
conditional on Xi, is given by
P (Mi = 1|Xi) = P (α′Xi + ε1i ≥ 0|Xi) = H
(
α′Xi
σ1
)
. (2)
The conditional expected value of Mi, E(Mi|Xi) = H(α′Xi) can be inter-
preted as the probability that a firm in financial distress exit the market. As
already noticed in the previous section, a situation of financial distress is po-
tentially observed selectively. The data generating process may be analyzed
by the means of probit analysis. The error terms in both probit estimations
might contain some common omitted variables, i.e. ρ(ε1i, ε2i) 6= 0. In this
case, αˆ on the basis of only partly observed financial distress yields incon-
sistent estimates. I correct for the potential bias using a selection equation
as suggested by Heckman (1979) and applied for dichotomous variables by
Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981). The regression of the subsample of partly
observed distressed firms can be written as:
E(Mi|Xi, D∗i ≥ 0) = α′Xi + E(ε1i|Xi, D∗i ≥ 0). (3)
Under the assumption that ε1i and ε2i are bivariate standard normal dis-
tributed with correlation ρ, it follows that
E(ε1i|Xi, D∗i ≥ 0) = ρλi (4)
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with
λi =
h(Ai)
H(−Ai) and Ai = −[βX], (5)
where h and H are the probability distribution function and H the cumulative
distribution function. The regression function can be rewritten as
Mi = α
′Xi + ρλˆi + ε1i, (6)
where Mi captures firm exit and Xi consists of variables grouped as Banking
and Finance, Internal Factors, and External Factors. The vector λ can be
consistently estimated as λˆ based on the estimates of βˆ of the probit Selection
Equation.
4.2 Estimation Results and Discussion
Estimation Results In this section I present the results of the cross-
sectional regression of market exit. The model is estimated for the period of
financial distress and up to 4 successive periods in order to take into account
a delay in the borrower's and lender's decision-making process, as well as a
delay in observing the firm's market exit. Robust clustered standard errors
are used due to firms with multiple episodes of financial distress during the
sample period.
Table 6 reports the estimates of the bivariate selection equation. The cor-
relation coefficient ρˆ is found to be significant different from zero at the 1%
level. Estimates obtained from a normal probit model are likely to be ineffi-
cient. Branch Quality is found to be negative, suggesting that branches with
lower investigation quality are less likely to observe firms in financial distress,
as expected. If Creditreform either investigated a firm again, recently, or is
commissioned to collect debt, firm information is more accurate and it is
more likely that financial distress is observed. Both variables, Investigation
and Debt Collection are found to be positive. Dummy variables indicating
missing information about age and industry are found to be negative signif-
icant. For firms listed in business register information is publicly available
and investigation costs are reduced. Harhoff et al. (1998) find that high-risk
firms are more likely to choose limited liability as the legal form. Therefore
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it is more likely that these firms get financially distressed. In addition it is
more likely that these cases are observed, since limited liability firms need to
be registered and more public information is available. Surprisingly, Business
Register is found to be negative.
I now turn to the firm survival equation. Table 1 provides marginal effects
of selected variables. Table 7 shows the models coefficients and Table 8 the
full list of marginal effects. Empirical findings support the hypotheses that
lending strategies for financially distressed firms differ across bank types.
More than a quarter of the difference in survival probability presented in
Table 4 in the descriptive statistics can be assigned to the bank type. A
firm's probability to survive the fourth period after financial distress is 1.3
percentage points higher if financed by Public Banks compared to the basis
group of Private Banks.
The effects are even stronger for cooperative banks than for public banks.
This might be for two reasons. Since cooperative banks are traditionally in-
volved in financing small firms, they are well diversified and are able to
compensate potential losses. Second, most customers of cooperative banks
are also members.14 Although the members' personal influence is limited
since votes are mostly restricted to individuals rather than shares, other
entrepreneurs might get elected to join the cooperative banks board of su-
pervisors and other committees deciding on investment guidelines.
Compared to other Banking and Finance variables, such as Real Estate
or the entrepreneurs human capital (Master Craftsman or Academic) the ef-
fects on public or cooperative banks are weaker. However, differences between
firms' survival probability among bank types can be interpreted as economi-
cally significant, since the model control for economic factors of firms' market
exit and all banks act under the same, strict regulation scheme.
The reason for the observed differences in lending strategies among bank
types remains unclear. Matthey (2008) argues that private banks adopt
a hard-nosed lending strategy in order to attract low risk firms. If this
hypothesis is empirical valid, public bank's credit portfolio would need to
show higher risk compared to private banks.
14Until the 1970s cooperative banks were allowed to provide financial services for mem-
bers only.
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Table 1: Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES exit t exit t+ 1 exit t+ 2 exit t+ 3 exit t+ 4
Banking and Finance
Public banks -0.002 -0.004 -0.010* -0.013** -0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Cooperative -0.013** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.022***
banks (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
BMC -0.011 -0.042 -0.068* -0.054 -0.083**
(0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
No. of bank -0.008** -0.008** -0.007 -0.006 -0.006
relations (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Debt -0.006 0.0002 0.002 0.007 0.010
collection (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
History of -0.014*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.024***
distress (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Real estate -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.042*** -0.039*** -0.042***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Internal and External Factors
Business 0.316*** 0.291*** 0.268*** 0.247*** 0.225***
register (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Management -0.043*** -0.051*** -0.055*** -0.060*** -0.065***
team (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Master -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.045*** -0.047***
craftsman (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Academic -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.039***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
East Germany 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.055** 0.052*** 0.053***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
No. of Obs. 4,723,708 4,723,708 4,723,708 4,723,707 4,723,706
Selected variables, selection equation included, robust clustered
standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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In contrast to Paul et al. (2003), who estimated bank's portfolio risk based on
self-reported risk profiles by entrepreneurs, this cannot be supported by the
data at hand. Private banks seem to finance more riskier firms. From Figure
1 one can infer that credit portfolio of public and cooperative banks is first
and from Figure 2 that it is second order stochastic dominant compared to
private banks' credit portfolio in terms of risk.15 Cooperative banks show the
lowest credit risk portfolio. If one assumes that private banks finance larger
firms, the risk exposure of private banks' credit portfolio is even higher.
Banks active in less concentrated markets are better able to skim future
profits and should be more likely to keep financing financial distressed firms.
As the number of banks active in a district decreases and concentration
therefore becomes higher, firm's probability of exiting the market decreases
(See variable BMC ). This finding is in line with hypotheses stated by Ongena
and Smith (1998); Sharpe (1990); Rajan (1992). However, the significance is
weak and varies across periods, since there is low variation in concentration
across districts. The measurement could be also improved by taking the
bank's market share in corporate finance into account.
There are further interesting findings, concerning firm's financing behav-
ior and internal factors influencing debt renegotiation as the underlying pro-
cess of firm's exit probability. I find only low and mostly insignificant influ-
ence of the number of bank relations on firm survival. Firms or entrepreneurs
that are able to offer Real Estate property for securitization show a lower
probability of exiting the market. The same is observed for firms that are
managed by at least one person that holds a master certificate or univer-
sity degree. Either educated managers are better able to renegotiate debt or
education signals better future prospects and therefore lower risk. A larger
management team can better combine different abilities that are crucial for
business. In addition, debt holders have a better position to execute their
claims against a number of debtors in case of a market exit. The probability
of market exit reduces as the number of managers increases.
15Results of estimates of the cumulative distribution and kerneldensity using the overall
rating are similar.
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 18
There is a dynamic effect for a firm's History of Distress. In the period of
financial distress the effect is negative and significant, while the sign changes
in period t+1 and is significant from period t+3 ongoing. Financiers know
that the firm has managed several crises and are not willing to shut down
immediately. Over time firms can present a concept how to deal with the
crises. Financiers on their part assess whether the firm is viable. Since it is
likely that the firm is enfeebled after a series of financial distress this might
not be the case and the firm might exit.
Further findings of internal and external factors of firm survival are in
line with the literature, while two findings are worth to mention. First, age
is found to have a non-linear negative effect on market exit. This finding
is consistent with the literature on firm survival (Audretsch and Mahmood,
1995). With increasing firm age the probability of surviving financial crises
increases substantially. The highest age class is an exception. Firms that age
50 years or older show a higher probability of exiting the market compared
to young firms. This might reflect difficulties in transferring business to
another generation. Second, even ten to fifteen years after the reunification
firms located in East Germany are more likely to exit the market. This
reflects still existing regional differences in product and banking markets due
to German reunification.
Robustness Checks, Discussion, and Limitations The data available
as well as the corresponding empirical model have some limitations that need
to be considered for the interpretation of the results. Coefficients of Business
Register are found to be positive and highly significant in all periods and
marginal effects are considerably high. These findings are consistent with
those presented by Harhoff et al. (1998). However, as time goes by after
financial distress the effect reduces indicating that it takes longer to observe
voluntary market exit of firms not publicly registered. Therefore, sample
selection problems might still exist.
Market exits due to insolvencies might be over-represented. Voluntary
market exit is considered only if related characteristics implemented by Cred-
itreform can be observed. A proper assumption would be that firms which
were not investigated or the information on which was not updated for a long
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time have closed. However, this would not solve the problem. Accordingly,
observations of deteriorating mode of payment are rare for these firms.
In addition to firms exiting the market after financial distress the panel
also contains observations on firms that fail without a deteriorating mode
of payment. Three cases can be considered. First, the deteriorating state is
simply not observed. Selection equation incorporated in the model should
mitigate possible selection bias. Second, a firm's status already refers to
the worst case. For this reason further deteriorating is not possible. An
institutional problem is given by German bankruptcy legislation for indebted
firms. They need to file for bankruptcy, while bankruptcy is for balance sheet
rather than for solvency reasons. Logically, a deteriorating status of mode of
payment is not observed.
In addition, banks' lending strategy and firms' financial distress and exit
might be endogenous. If the hypothesis of self-selection of firms according
to their risk to a certain bank type stated by Matthey (2008) is valid, the
probability of distress is higher for firms financed by public and cooperative
banks, respectively. The question arises whether bank dummies are endoge-
nous. This should not be the case for the model presented here. The model is
restricted to financially distressed firms only. In most cases the firm's choice
of a financing partner has been made a long time ago. Further, the firms via-
bility does not depend on that choice. For robustness check the deteriorating
state of firm's credit rating is used as the dependent variable. Information
concerning credit rating is produced by Creditreform indicating the firm's
credit worthiness that is a part of the overall rating. Results remain stable
and are provided by the author on request.
5 Conclusion
Survival of financially distressed firm's depends on their access to finance.
Banks need to re-audit these firms and decide whether to keep financing
or liquidating even viable firms. The bank's strategy financing financially
distressed firms depends on several factors. It is influenced by the liquidation
value, the value of collateral, the possibility to gain inside information and
control over firm's assets. It might also depend on the bank's type. Public
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and cooperative banks have a mandate supporting regional economy and
are especially involved in corporate finance of local and small or medium
sized firms. Therefore, their investment in sector specification might differ
compared to private banks.
With this paper I have explored whether differences in lending strategies
among bank types exist. I estimate the probability of a market exit for
financially distressed firms, depending on the type of the firms main financing
institution. I control for firm's financing behavior, as well as for further
internal and external factors that influences the probability of exiting the
market, such as firm age, firm size, or entrepreneurs educational background.
For German firms in the period between 2000 and 2005, I find that the
probability of exiting the market after financial distress is higher for firms fi-
nanced by private banks compared to those financed by public banks. Effects
are even larger for firms financed by cooperative banks. The reason for this
behavior remains unclear. Private banks might have incentives to compete
in repayments rather then interest streams. They could act as hard-nosed
bankers and adopt stricter rules if firms get financial distressed or rule out
renegotiation at all. High-risk firms anticipating that behavior would self-
select to public or cooperative banks. This is not supported by the finding
of a riskier credit portfolio of private banks, based on an analysis of firms'
credit scores, indicating that private banks take on higher risk in the first
place. Firm's bank choice seems crucial for a better understanding of this
effect and is left for further research.
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A Appendix
Table 2: Market Share of Banking Sectors in Germany, 2000-2005
Market Share in: Total Assets Corporate Finance
Private Banks 39.8% 44.0%
Real Estate Credit Institution 12.8% 13.6%
Commercial Banks 27.0% 30.4%
Public Banks 40.1% 35.3%
Savings Banks 22.4% 15.3%
Landesbank 17.7% 20.0%
Cooperative Banks 12.4% 12.1%
Others 7.7% 12.1%
Source: Bundesverband deutscher Banken e.V. (2009)
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Table 6: Model Results - Part 1 Selection Equation
Selection Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES MoP MoP MoP MoP MoP
Branch Quality -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0014) (0.001)
Investigation 0.455*** 0.457*** 0.459*** 0.460*** 0.461***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0040 (0.004)
Business Register -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Debt Collection 0.741*** 0.741*** 0.741*** 0.741*** 0.741***
(0.006) (0.0063) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Industry M -0.321*** -0.321*** -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.322***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age M -0.348*** -0.341*** -0.336*** -0.333*** -0.329***
(0.008) (0.0083) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant -2.243*** -2.244*** -2.244*** -2.245*** -2.245***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ρˆ 0.740*** 0.635*** 0.562*** 0.525*** 0.472***
(0.035) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Robust clustered (firm) standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 7: Model Results - Part 2 Main Equation
Main Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES exit t exit t+ 1 exit t+ 2 exit t+ 3 exit t+ 4
Banking & Finance
Public -0.005 -0.009 -0.023* -0.031** -0.032**
Banks (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Cooperative -0.030** -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.046*** -0.053***
Banks (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
BMC -0.025 -0.099 -0.159* -0.124 -0.196**
(0.086) (0.093) (0.095) (0.098) (0.100)
No. of bank -0.019** -0.0198** -0.0155 -0.0132 -0.0142
relations (0.009) (0.010) (0.0100) (0.010) (0.010)
Debt Collection 0.391*** 0.364*** 0.337*** 0.330*** 0.311***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
History of -0.033*** 0.004 0.026*** 0.042*** 0.056***
distress (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Real Estate -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.103*** -0.093*** -0.101***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Internal Factors
Business 0.661*** 0.633*** 0.594*** 0.549*** 0.507***
Register (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
ln Size -0.009 0.0247 0.053** 0.076*** 0.104***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
ln Size2 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.030** 0.015
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
ln Size3 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 2 -0.045** -0.101*** -0.123*** -0.131*** -0.138***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Age 3 -0.148*** -0.239*** -0.287*** -0.315*** -0.337***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Age 4 -0.207*** -0.299*** -0.350*** -0.382*** -0.407***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
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Main Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES exit t exit t+1 exit t+2 exit t+3 exit t+4
Age 5 -0.188*** -0.298*** -0.356*** -0.391*** -0.416***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Age 6 0.483*** 0.378*** 0.313*** 0.266*** 0.234***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Management -0.100*** -0.121*** -0.132*** -0.142*** -0.153***
Team (0.0181) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Management -0.224*** -0.245*** -0.257*** -0.275*** -0.282***
Team M (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Master -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.097*** -0.109*** -0.115***
Craftsman (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Academic -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.074*** -0.083*** -0.095***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
External Factors
Industry Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
East 0.124*** 0.134*** 0.129*** 0.123*** 0.127***
Germany (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
∆ local 0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
Insolvencies (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Year Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Constant -2.078*** -1.776*** -1.542*** -1.365*** -1.166***
(0.055) (0.061) (0.065) (0.066) (0.069)
No. of Obs. 4,723,716 4,723,704 4,723,687 4,723,677 4,723,662
Robust clustered (firm) standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 8: Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES exit t exit t+ 1 exit t+ 2 exit t+ 3 exit t+ 4
Banking & Finance
Public Banks -0.002 -0.004 -0.010* -0.013** -0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Cooperative -0.013** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.022***
Banks (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
BMC -0.011 -0.042 -0.068* -0.054 -0.083**
(0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
No. of -0.008** -0.008** -0.007 -0.006 -0.006
bank relations (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Debt -0.006 0.0002 0.002 0.007 0.010
Collection (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
History of -0.014*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.024***
distress (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Real Estate -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.042*** -0.039*** -0.042***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Internal Factors
Business 0.316*** 0.291*** 0.268*** 0.247*** 0.225***
Register (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ln Size -0.004 0.010 0.022** 0.032*** 0.043***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
ln Size2 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.013** 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ln Size3 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Age 2 -0.019** -0.042*** -0.051*** -0.055*** -0.057***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Age 3 -0.061** -0.096*** -0.115*** -0.128*** -0.137***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Age 4 -0.084*** -0.116*** -0.136*** -0.150*** -0.160***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES exit t exit t+1 exit t+2 exit t+3 exit t+4
Age 5 -0.076*** -0.116*** -0.138*** -0.154*** -0.164***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Age 6 0.219*** 0.164*** 0.134*** 0.114*** 0.099***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Management -0.043*** -0.051*** -0.055*** -0.060*** -0.065***
Team (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Management -0.092*** -0.099*** -0.104*** -0.112*** -0.115***
Team M (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Master -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.045*** -0.047***
Craftsman (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Academic -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.039***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
External Factors
Industry Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
East 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.055** 0.052*** 0.053***
Germany (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
∆ local 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
Insolvencies (7.3e-5) (7.5e-5) (7.4e-5) (7.4e-5) (7.5e-5)
Year Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
No. of Obs. 4,723,708 4,723,708 4,723,708 4,723,707 4,723,706
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure 1: Risk Portfolio related to Bank Type (2005) - Cumulative Distribu-
tion
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Note: Credit Rating Score 1 indicate low risk and 6 high risk. Calculation is based on
the number of firms financed by each bank type where a credit risk score was assigned by
Creditreform in August 2005.
Source: Author's own calculation based on the MUP (ZEW)
Figure 2: Kerneldensity of Bank Types Credit Risk (2005)
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Note: Credit Rating Score 1 indicate low risk and 6 high risk. Calculation is based on
the number of firms financed by each bank type where a credit risk score was assigned by
Creditreform in August 2005.
Source: Author's own calculation based on the MUP (ZEW)
